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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes chronologically the causes of the 
collapse of communism in East Germany. The principal 
guideline for this analysis is Peter Gourevitch's 
hypothesis. Gourevitch stresses the importance of examining 
domestic and international politics simultaneously, as a 
whole, and not as separate parts. Therefore to discover the 
reasons for the collapse of communism in East Germany, it is 
necessary to focus on both internal and external pressures.
The East German regime lost power due to a combination 
of three factors (one internal and two external). First, 
domestic problems existed in the East German economic, 
social and political systems. These problems were 
exacerbated as East and West German relations improved. 
Second, persistent West German financial, cultural and 
technical penetration into East Germany provided 
alternatives to the communist political, ideological and 
economic models. Finally, the Soviet Union's own internal 
economic crisis forced the Soviet leaders to relinquish 
their hegemony of East Germany. The Soviet leaders made it 
clear that Soviet troops would no longer be used to protect 
the anti-reformist East German government. This 
unanticipated decision sparked the East Germans to revolt 
against their leaders.
Additionally, this paper examines the definitions of 
legitimation and revolution theories and applies them to the 
particular case of East Germany.
v
THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EAST GERMANY
1945 - 1990
INTRODUCTION
In late 1989, communist regimes collapsed unexpectedly 
throughout Eastern Europe. The weak and illegitimate East 
German regime was no exception. A combination of three 
factors, two external and one internal, led the East Germans 
to revolt. First, domestic problems inherent in the 
ineffectual East German social, economic and political 
systems contributed to the communists' fall from power. 
Second, the successful West German penetration into East 
Germany gave the East Germans aspirations towards another 
political, social and economical model. Finally, the Soviet 
Union called for radical reforms not only in the Soviet 
Union but also in Eastern Europe and thus openly challenged 
the authority of the anti-reformist East German communist 
regime.
The recent fall of the East German communist party 
(SED) will be analyzed by exploring several schools of 
thought. The over-arching theoretical basis for this thesis 
is Peter Gourevitch's hypothesis that international politics 
and domestic politics must be analyzed together as an 
integrated whole. According to Gourevitch, international 
and domestic politics are interrelated. They affect each
2
3other and cannot be separated. Although Gourevitch's 
hypothesis seems elementary, writers often tend to 
concentrate on either domestic or international factors and 
thus provide incomplete analyses. Therefore, in order to 
comprehend fully the reasons for the downfall of the SED it 
is essential not only to explore the internal situation in 
East Germany, but to examine the impact of external 
pressures as well.
Using Gourevitch's hypothesis as the foundation of this 
paper, traditional domestic theories of legitimation and 
revolution will be examined in the context of the 
international system. First, although legitimation theories 
explain how regimes gain popular acceptance and support, in 
the GDR, the East Germans saw the SED as illegitimate, yet 
the SED was the party in power. In this state, political 
authority depended not on popular support, but on force. 
Throughout its tenure, the SED did attempt to establish 
indigenous legitimacy using different procedures, such as 
economic achievements or ideology; however, as the various 
chapters will show, in the end, it failed. The East Gentian 
population realized that other nations, specifically Western 
ones, had alternative legitimation methods which emphasized 
participation and responsiveness. The international system 
allowed a comparison of Eastern and Western legitimation 
techniques and clearly the Western way proved more 
attractive.
4Second, most revolution theories tend to highlight the 
importance of domestic conditions and therefore isolate the 
state from international political developments. Yet, in 
the particular case of the GDR it is impossible to separate 
the internal events from the external ones; it is evident 
that external factors created the catalyst which led to the 
East German revolt. Outside pressures from West Germany and 
from the Soviet Union contributed to the fall of the East 
German communists. West Germany (FRG) penetrated East 
Germany (GDR) politically, economically and socially through 
various means such as the Deutschemark and television. The 
Soviet Union, with hegemony over Eastern Europe, greatly 
influenced the foreign and domestic policies of the SED. 
Mikhail Gorbachev's sweeping policy changes and the SED's 
reluctance to accept them, ultimately destroyed the 
political control of the East German communist party. 
Gorbachev introduced momentous changes in Soviet domestic 
and foreign policy which sparked the tumultuous events in 
Eastern Europe. Therefore, the East German revolution did 
not occur solely as a result of domestic conditions, but 
because of a combination of both domestic and external 
factors.
Just before midnight on 9 November 1989, the SED 
officially decided to open East Germany's borders with the 
West. The East German communists' attempted isolation of 
the East German population had come to an end. What few
5people realize, however, is that the isolation had already- 
ended before the SED opened up East Germany's borders. The 
"fall of the Berlin Wall" did not occur overnight. For 
decades West Germany systematically chipped away at East 
Germany. Through its political advances, economic 
assistance and technological prowess, West Germany gradually 
managed to penetrate a supposedly impenetrable communist 
society. Although East Germany's communists tried 
desperately to control the amount of West German 
penetration, and apparently succeeded for some time, in the 
end they failed. The ideas and technology absorbed from the 
West proved more powerful than those of the SED. The FRG's 
successful penetration of East German society contributed to 
the destruction of the wall, to ending three decades of the 
SED's control of the GDR, and finally to the termination of 
the German Democratic Republic itself.
This thesis will demonstrate the critical role played 
by the Soviet Union in the breakdown of Communism in East 
Germany. From the end of World War II until 1989, few 
doubted the Soviet Union's hegemony over Eastern Europe. In 
fact, until the chaotic events of 1989, many failed to 
realize that the USSR's hold over its satellite communist 
states was weakening. For years, political analysts had 
stressed East Germany's strategic importance to the Soviet 
Union and argued that the USSR would use military power to 
keep the GDR within the communist bloc. However, recent
6events proved those analysts wrong. Not only did the Soviet 
Union under the leadership of Gorbachev allow the political 
transformation of East Germany to a democratic state, he 
also allowed the GDR to leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO.
This thesis will address chronologically the collapse 
of the SED in seven chapters. Chapter I explains how the 
international state system affected the domestic and foreign 
policies of the postwar Germanies and raises questions 
regarding the legitimacy of the East German regime. Chapter 
II discusses the period of detente (from the late 1960s to 
the mid-1970s) between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and explains how it affected the East and West German 
regimes. Chapter III recounts the establishment of official 
relations between East and West Germany. It describes 
measures taken by the East German regime to prevent Western 
pressures from creating any internal destabilization in the 
GDR. Chapter IV explains the various forms of West German 
penetration into East Germany (economic, human and 
technological) and discusses their impact on the East German 
population and the SED regime. Chapter V examines the 
erosion of detente in the early 1980s between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and contrasts the decay of 
superpower relations with the continued improvement in East 
and West German relations. Chapter V also explains how and 
why this bilateral detente was carried out. Chapter VI 
introduces Gorbachev and his inventive policy changes. It
7shows how these policy changes contributed to the East 
German revolt against their communist leaders. Finally, 
Chapter VII reiterates the internal and external causes of 
the collapse of communism in the East Germany.
CHAPTER I
LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION: 1940S-60S
The postwar era and the quickly emerging American- 
Soviet rivalry determined the fate of a nation once known as 
Germany. This fact relates to Peter Gourevitch's theory 
which stresses the inseparability of internal and external 
events. He states that domestic and international politics 
are parts of an interactive system. When Germany was 
divided into East and West Germany, both states' internal 
and external policies reflected those of the Soviet Union 
and the United States. This included their patrons' 
strategies for legitimizing rule. While the West emphasized 
responsiveness and participation, the East emphasized 
ideology and economic achievement; however, force was the 
only real source of legitimation there. In addition to 
legitimation strategies, both East and West Germany followed 
their respective patron's position in regard to 
reunification.
Although much of divided Germany lay in ruins after 
World War II, this area was still viewed by the victors as 
central to the future of Europe. Therefore, the character 
of the postwar Germanies was shaped by the goals and
8
9priorities of the principal victorious powers. The United 
States and the Soviet Union determined the political, 
economic and social systems that East and West Germany 
adopted. One was to be a free, democratic state, 
legitimized by popular support, while the other one would 
become a tightly controlled, socialist state, ruled by 
force. With each Germany linked by strong political, 
military and economic ties to its respective patron, 
international developments would affect greatly the policies 
of both East and West Germany.
The dominant roles played by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the international political arena explains 
the partition of the German nation in 1945. As Peter 
Gourevitch states: "International politics explains the
dismemberment of Germany after 1945 and the character of the 
two regimes which have grown up in the East and West."1 At 
the end of World War II, the continent of Europe was divided 
into two opposing spheres— a socialist one under the 
hegemony of the Soviet Union and a democratic one influenced 
by the United States. The postwar era is described as: "A
historical anomaly in which the Continent was dominated by 
two outside powers, whose alliances and nuclear arsenals
1Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The
International Sources of Domestic Politics," International 
Organizations 32 (Autumn 1987): 899.
10
maintained a fretful balance."2 Hitler's defeated Nazi 
Germany was also divided as the Cold War between the two 
superpowers emerged. Under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, 
the Soviet Union seized the eastern portion of Germany, 
which officially became known in October 1949 as the German 
Democratic Republic. Simultaneously, the three remaining 
allied war powers (the United States, Great Britain and 
France), pulled the western portion of Germany, which became 
the Federal Republic of Germany, into their sphere of 
influence.
Neither state had much choice in the matter because 
external factors determined the character of each regime.
In the GDR, under a facade of democratization and free 
elections, the Soviets backed a communist-led coalition 
government, the Anti-fascist Democratic Front.3 By April 
194 6, the Soviet Union forced the merger of the social 
democrats with the communists, creating the Socialist Unity 
Party (SED), which the communists dominated. With the 
abandonment of competitive elections in 1947, the SED 
succeeded in squeezing out the opposition parties in the
2Russell Watson, Michael Meyers Margaret, Gerrard 
Warner, and Fred Coleman, "A New Germany," Newsweek 9 July 
1990, 29.
3According to William E. Griffith, ed., Central and 
Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?. (London: Westview
Press, 1989), 315, during World War II, under the direction
of the Soviet leadership, German Communist leaders exiled in 
Moscow were planning to sovietize the Soviet zone of 
Germany.
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coalition. The opposition, made up of the Christian 
Democrats, Liberal Democrats, National Democratic Party of 
Germany and the Democratic Farmers' Association, banded 
together to create the National Front, which by 1949, the 
SED effectively dominated.4 Propped up by Moscow, the East 
German revolutionary regime ruled by force and not popular 
support. Although elections existed, they did not afford 
the possibility of choice between political alternatives, 
but instead were propagandistic in nature.5
Meanwhile, the FRG had no real alternative but to 
become a democratic state aligned with the Western nations 
and the concept of legitimate rule by popular support. As 
E.H. Albert observed: "The only choice Federal Germany ever
had was between protecting its security by joining the 
Western alliance, or jeopardizing its freedom through 
staying neutral."6 Thus occurred the division of what was 
once one nation into two states— each one having separate 
political, economic and social systems and each one with
4Eric Waldman, "The German Democratic Republic:
Moscow's Faithful Ally," in East Central Europe: Yesterday.
Today. Tomorrow. ed. Milorad Drachkovitch (Stanford: Hoover
University Press, 1982), 268.
5Georg Brunner, "Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation 
Procedures in East European Systems," in Political 
Legitimation in Communist States, eds. T. H. Rigby and 
Ferenc Feher (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 38.
6E.H. Albert, "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in 
Germany," International Affairs (London) 46 (April 1970): 
298.
12
leading parties having different strategies for legitimizing 
their power.
As previously mentioned, the postwar evolution of
domestic and foreign policy in the divided Germanies can
only be understood in the context of the geopolitics of the
United States/Soviet rivalry. During the 1950s and 1960s
East and West German foreign and domestic policies changed
because of external pressure from their respective alliance
partners (the United States and the Soviet Union) and also
because of internal pressure. In determining the reasons
for these policy shifts, it is necessary to examine
international relations and domestic politics together.
Separate studies of the international and domestic political
realms would provide an incomplete analysis of the
motivations behind the changes. Political theorist Peter
Gourevitch states the two are parts of an interactive system
and makes the important conclusion:
The international system is not only a consequence of 
domestic politics and structures but a cause of them. 
Economic relations and military pressures constrain an 
entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy 
decisions to political forms. International relations 
and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated 
that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as 
wholes.
Viewed in this context, the evolution of the post-war 
Germanies would be affected by the changing dynamics of a 
world divided by competing political and military alliances
7Gourevitch, 911.
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shaped by Moscow and Washington. As we shall see, domestic 
politics, trade and military pressures were also part of an 
interactive system that shaped the course of not only the 
two Germanies but the bi-polar world order following World 
War II.
The struggle over the future of Germany, which began
with the defeat of the Third Reich, became a struggle over
the future of Europe. As East European regimes fell under
the authority of the Soviet Union, the United States and
West European states perceived a rising threat of communist
aggression against Western Europe. It was in this context
that two hostile military alliances arose in 1955.
Sponsored by the United States, the Federal Republic joined
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In response
to the formation of NATO, the Soviet Union created the
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which the GDR joined in
1956. It is important to note that the United States and
the Soviet Union dominated their respective alliances and
that as a result, neither the GDR nor the FRG could act
independently without the consent of its powerful patron.8
Political scientist Ernest Plock explains the relationships:
Given the dominant political and military role of the 
U.S. and USSR in the affairs of the newly created East 
and West German states, it was hardly surprising that 
the external policies of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) were
8Eric G. Frey, Division and Detente: The Germanies and
Their Alliances (New York: Praeger, 1987), 59.
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viewed as appendages to those conducted by their 
founding patrons.
The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union
dominated West and East German domestic and foreign affairs
created challenges to the legitimacy of the two regimes,
although less so for the FRG leaders than for the SED.
Although many definitions of legitimacy exist, according to
German political analyst Henry Krisch, "Legitimacy is the
foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both
with a consciousness on the governments part that it has
the right to govern with some recognition by the governed of
that right."10 Similarly, T. H. Rigby defines the concept
of legitimate political authority as follows:
The expectation of political authorities that people 
will comply with their demands is typically based nq,t 
only on such considerations as the latter's fear of 
punishment, hope of reward, habit or apathy, but also 
on the notion that they have the right to make such 
demands.11
Whereas the Federal Republic was a state that through 
self-determination and free elections chose to become 
democratic, the East German regime was viewed by West
9Ernest D. Plock, The Basic Treaty and the Evolution of 
East-West German Relations (London: Westview Press, 198 6),
3.
10Henry Krisch, "Political Legitimation in the German 
Democratic Republic," in Political Legitimation in Communist 
States, eds. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New York: St.
Martin*s Press, 1982), 111.
11T. H. Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy,
Weber, and Communist Mono-organisational Systems," in 
Political Legitimation in Communist States, eds. T. H. Rugby 
and Ferenc Feher (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 1.
15
Germany and even by the East German population as having no 
legitimacy based on popular support. Although the East 
German communist leaders believed they had the right to 
rule, the SED never enjoyed an essential element of 
legitimacy— positive popular acceptance or internal support 
for its rule. Because the eastern zone was taken over 
militarily by the Soviet Union and the Germans living there 
had no choice in determining their own political, economic 
or social systems, the GDR regime was seen by both the 
Western world and the East German population as 
illegitimate. The use of Soviet troops on 17 June 1953 to 
crush an East German popular uprising and the increasing 
number of East Germans fleeing the GDR confirmed the 
regime's illegitimacy. As Soviet troops remained stationed 
in the GDR and coerced the East German population into 
obedience, it seems obvious that force became the SED's only 
source of legitimation.12
The SED's legitimacy gap was compounded by the fact 
that unlike the democratic FRG, the communist GDR state was 
dominated by a single, highly centralized party which did 
not permit any meaningful opposition or competition. This 
dominant party, in which both political and economic 
authority were placed, allowed no autonomy for society.
12After the uprising, the GDR1s leaders were dependent 
on force and the presence of over 350,000 Soviet troops to 
maintain their stability.
16
Polish-born author and theorist Maria Markus described the
SED's legitimacy crisis by stating:
The GDR seem[ed] to be characterized by a virtually 
complete absence of all the substantive conditions 
pertaining to the modern form of legitimation (the 
people as the source of authority, the autonomy of 
civil society and the possibility of formulation of and 
choice between alternatives.)13
The GDR regime perceived its lack of legitimacy and 
attempted to rectify this situation through both external 
and domestic policy initiatives. On the domestic front, the 
GDR regime attempted to gain legitimacy through its social 
and economic policies. The SED used Marxist-Leninist 
ideology to educate the East German population and justify 
its rule. The regime linked its rule to the tradition of 
the Soviet Union for the SED had no previous tradition of 
its own.14 Besides using propaganda for self-legitimation, 
the SED sought to use task-oriented policies to achieve 
legitimacy. According to Henry Krisch the question of 
legitimacy in the GDR "can best be understood by defining 
legitimacy as the intended outcome of a set of regime 
policies congruent with the particular circumstances of the
13Maria Markus, "Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimation 
in East European Societies," in Political Legitimation in 
Communist States, eds. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 83.
14Agnes Heller, "Phases of Legitimation in Soviet-type 
Societies," Political Legitimation in Communist States, eds. 
T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1982): 62.
17
state and the aspirations of the people.15 The .means for 
achieving popular support in the GDR would be through the 
policies themselves. So, unlike Western nations who seek 
legitimacy through rule-oriented policies, policies derived 
from a consensus among the governed, the SED believed it 
could gain legitimacy through goal-oriented, economic 
policies set by the leaders.16 These policies ignored 
popular acceptance and responsiveness and emphasized 
economic output and achievement.
The GDR regime also hoped to convert its coerced 
legitimacy into real legitimacy through seeking the FRG1s 
acknowledgement of East Germany^ statehood. But for the 
Federal Republic to acknowledge the other German state was 
seen by West German leaders to be defeating their goal o& 
reunification. This West German conviction that the East 
German regime lacked legitimacy was expressed in the form of 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer1s Hallstein Doctrine (1955), in 
which Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any 
government that had relations with the GDR.17
Confident in the legitimacy of their regime and
15Krisch, "Political Legitimation in the GDR," 113.
16Ibid.
17The Federal Republic hoped that the Hallstein 
Doctrine would cause the political and economic 
destabilization of East Germany and thus would lead to 
German reunification. The FRG did not apply the doctrine to 
the USSR for Bonn and Moscow already had established 
relations earlier that year.
18
convinced they were expressing and representing a national 
consensus, West German policy makers sought two main foreign 
policy goals. The first goal was to reunify Germany and the 
second, and more pressing one, was to establish strong ties 
to the West. However, these two aims proved to be 
contradictory in the short run.
The preamble of the FRG's 1949 constitution, known as 
the Basic Law, contains the unification imperative: "The
entire German people is called on to achieve in free self- 
determination the unity and freedom of Germany."18 Without 
reunification, there would be no relations with the eastern 
portion of Germany and therefore, no negotiations on other 
matters. According to Josef Korbel, "he [Adenauer] wanted 
to act from a position of strength and to expose the 
absurdity of a divided Germany by a complete isolation of 
the Soviet satellite."19
Yet although Adenauer, as most other Germans, sincerely 
sought unification, much of the reunification rhetoric was 
intended for domestic political consumption. Politicians 
saw the German question to be a politically popular issue 
and realized that they must maintain a rhetorical commitment 
to reunification in order to satisfy the West German public,
18Plock, 12.
19Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: I, Intra-
German Relations," Orbis 13 (Winter 1970): 1050-51.
19
even though reunification seemed infeasible in the short 
run.
Adenauer's scheme of creating strong West German links 
to the West proved to be more successful than his 
reunification policy. From the West, Adenauer sought 
military security and economic resources to support 
political and economic recovery for the FRG. In order to 
obtain them, the Chancellor needed to prove the FRG's 
allegiance to NATO and West European stability. Although 
West Germany's allies continued to support Adenauer's call 
for reunification, they viewed reunification with 
apprehension. Not only did they fear Germany's past 
aggressive behavior, but they also did not want to upset the 
recently established balance of power in Europe. So, 
despite West Germans' hope for reunification, its likelihood 
seemed to lessen with each passing year as the FRG became 
firmly integrated into the West and NATO.
The East German leader Walter Ulbricht and his fellow 
communists also sought the goal of reunification 
rhetorically— but on different terms from West Germany's.
The communist leader sought reunification, not as a 
democratic state but as a socialist one.20 However, it is 
unlikely that Ulbricht believed that unification of a 
socialist Germany was a realistic option. At home, Ulbricht
20Dietrich Orlow, History of Modern Germany: 1870 to
Present. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1987), 333.
20
had to contend with a dissatisfied East German population 
who clearly wanted any reunification to take place on West 
German rather than East German terms.
Abroad, the USSR's policy regarding reunification had 
changed. By 1955, the Soviet leadership had come to accept 
the status quo in Central Europe and shifted its 
reunification policy to a "two Germanies" policy.21 The 
Soviets' goal of keeping the two German states separate was 
quickly reflected in Ulbricht's own policy toward the ERG. 
From the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 until 1971, 
the GDR remained in a period of "normalization" or seclusion 
from the West.
East Germany's policy of seclusion was motivated not 
only by Soviet pressure but also by Ulbricht's own domestic 
political strategy. According to A. J. McAdams, "Ulbricht 
in particular was assuredly more interested in consolidating 
his own state's authority than in the complexities of 
maintaining international socialism."22 The SED leader 
realized that contacts with the West were destabilizing and 
believed the GDR would be better served by turning inward.
Ulbricht feared that closer ties with the Federal 
Republic would delegitimize the GDR. He saw the FRG as a
21Wolfram Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy: 1949-
1979. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 116.
22A. James McAdams, East Germany and Detente 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21.
21
threatening ideological adversary. According to Henry 
Krisch:
The tangled web of the GDR's relationship both to its 
German national heritage and to its West German 
counterpart has provided the GDR leadership with an 
enormously difficult problem of devising legitimacy 
generating policy in this area.23
If official relations between the two Germanies were
established, Ulbricht believed that it would be impossible
to protect East Germans from the ways of the West Germans,
including their alternative form of legitimation. So,
although Ulbricht rhetorically called for reunification in
the early 1950s, he did so only when the chances of it were
slim. For example, he agreed on reunification if the FRG
were to discontinue its military alliance with NATO.24
During the late fifties and early sixties shifts
occurred in the international system which strongly affected
East-West German relations. The Western nations began to
lose interest in the strategy of isolating the East German
state. Despite the FRG1s threat of ending relations with
other regimes which recognized the other jGerman state, NATO
nations began working towards official relations with the
GDR. The Western allies shifted their focus from isolation
to developing diplomatic relations and expanding trade,
cultural and scientific exchanges. Then as West Germany
became aware of its allies' desires for improved relations
23Krisch, "Political Legitimation in the GDR," 114.
24Frey, 5.
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with the GDR, the FRG considered reversing its policy of 
isolating East Germany.
The reversal of the FRG1s policy of attempting to 
isolate East Germany was due in part to West German leaders1 
recognition that the policy was in fact having the opposite 
effect than the one intended and also to the election of a 
government of the center-left for the first time. As other 
members of the NATO alliance considered relations with the 
communist bloc states and withdrew support for German 
reunification, West Germany was faced with the danger of 
isolating itself from diplomatic relations and international 
trade.25 Gradually, "Bonn realized the danger of its 
negative stance toward the problem of peace and being left 
behind in . . . relations with the East" and sought to 
change its rigid policy towards East Germany.26
Changes in West German policy towards East Germany 
began with Christian Democrat Ludwig Erhard's Ostpolitik 
policy, by which, through the famous Peace Note of March 
1966, Erhard's government shifted "from outright hostility 
to the cautious opening of contacts with the countries of 
Eastern Europe."27 During the CDU/SPD Grand Coalition
25This policy became official NATO doctrine in 1967 
with the Harmel Report.
26Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A
Policy Toward the Soviet Allies," Orbis 14 (Summer 1970): 
329.
27Ibid.
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government's tenure, West Germany acknowledged that 
reunification could be pursued by a general detente instead 
of by isolation. Thus while East Germany retained a policy 
of isolation from the FRG throughout the 1960s, the West 
German government gradually shifted its policy to one of 
increased contact.
Without examining the international environment in the 
immediate postwar period, one could not fully understand the 
motivations driving East German foreign and domestic policy. 
The postwar balance of power in Europe and the structure of 
the German states were strongly influenced by the goals and 
priorities of the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
US and the USSR had divergent goals which could not be 
reconciled and led to the partition of Germany. East and 
West Germany adopted the political, economic and cultural 
systems of their superpower allies. Dominated by the United 
States, West Germany adopted the institutions, structures 
and procedures found in democratic states. Dominated by the 
Soviet Union, East Germany had little room for autonomous 
domestic or foreign policy making. This led the western 
nations and the East Germans themselves to regard the SED 
government as illegitimate. Despite this view, Western 
states began to consider establishing official relations
vt
with the East German regime in the late 1960s. As the next 
chapter reveals, in the long term, these relations came to 
pose an even more powerful threat to the legitimacy of the
24
East German regime than had been posed by the earlier policy 
of isolation.
CHAPTER II
DETENTE: 1960S-70S
In West German foreign policy, and in East-West 
relations generally, the period beginning in the late 1960s 
and lasting until the mid-1970s was characterized by 
detente. This era witnessed an improvement in relations 
between the Soviet Union and the United States which 
trickled down into their respective spheres of influence.
As Gourevitch's theory asserts, the international 
environment was to have an impact on the foreign policies of 
the East and West German regimes. For example, detente 
between the US and the USSR provided an opening for the FRG 
to seek greatly improved relations with East Germany. Thus, 
changes in the international environment facilitated a 
policy shift on the part of the West German government. Yet 
although the West German regime appeared eager to establish 
detente with the GDR in the late 1960s, the SED regime was 
extremely reluctant, mainly for domestic political reasons. 
East German leader Walter Ulbricht feared that increased 
trade and cultural relations with West Germany might 
undermine his regime by making East Germany appear inferior 
in comparison to West Germany. So, despite the prospect of 
the GDR receiving international recognition, Ulbricht tried 
unsuccessfully to prevent the establishment of East-West 
German relations.
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International systemic factors interacted with domestic 
political considerations to produce significant shifts in 
East and West German policy during the period of detente.
In West Germany, the easing of cold war tensions provided 
opportunities for the leadership to pursue its agenda of 
improved relations with the GDR. Meanwhile, in East 
Germany, the Soviet Union's desires for detente ultimately 
forced the recalcitrant East German leadership to abandon 
their isolationist stance vis-a-vis the FRG.
By the late 1960s, West Germany had gained considerable 
independence from the United States in the realm of foreign 
policy. Willy Brandt proclaimed that the Federal Republic 
had "assumed a new responsibility" and was no longer a 
"political dwarf."28 Nonetheless, the FRG's new goal of 
establishing relations with the GDR did not contradict, and 
in fact coincided with, reaffirmation of its commitment to 
maintain strong relations with the Western nations and NATO. 
West Germany realized that the Western powers would continue 
to support inter-German relations, so long as the stability 
of NATO and of West Germany's membership in it remained 
intact. In the past, the FRG had proved itself loyal to 
NATO and had adhered successfully to the principles of 
democracy. The United States began to tolerate more 
autonomous policy making by West German leaders towards the 
East.
28Korbel, "Ostpolitik: II," 327.
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However, as the FRG was gaining more autonomy in 
conducting its international affairs, the Soviet Union's 
hegemony over East German affairs continued. Stressing the 
concept of international socialism, the Soviet Union 
emphasized that the GDR's national interests must be 
secondary to those interests espoused by the USSR for the 
good of all socialism.29 With Soviet troops stationed in 
East Germany and its proximity to the USSR, the GDR's 
foreign policy could be controlled effectively by the 
Soviets.
In 1969, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
introduced a policy which called for rapprochement between 
the two Germanies.30 Brandt's new policy was motivated by 
the realization that the former policy of rejecting the GDR 
as a state was punishing the people who lived there rather 
than the government. Like former regimes, the Brandt 
Government continued to hope for and speak of reunification, 
yet the chancellor did not wish to make the East German 
population suffer for the actions of the Soviet controlled 
communist government. Brandt also saw an opportunity for 
West Germany to benefit by allowing the FRG to expand its
29The concept of international socialism was enforced 
with the Brezhnev Doctrine in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This 
doctrine officially condoned the use of force in Eastern 
Europe in order to challenge opponents of communism.
30A1though the SPD remained the leading coalition 
partner until 1982, the discovery of Brandt's personal 
assistant, Gunter Guillaume as an East German spy, led to 
the chancellor's replacement in 1974 by Helmut Schmidt.
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economic, technological and scientific exchanges with the 
Warsaw Pact nations.31 Perhaps even more important, Brandt 
and other West German leaders were convinced that their 
free-market, democratic state was inherently superior to the 
East German model, and hoped that an improvement in inter- 
German relations would bring the East Germans to this 
realization as well.
Coincident with the shift in West German policy towards 
the GDR was a shift in Soviet policy toward the West. This 
shift further improved the climate for closer relations 
between East and West Germany. At the Warsaw Pact Summit 
meeting held in Budapest during March of 1969, the Soviet 
Union officially declared that it was time for stronger 
East-West relations.
The USSR had several reasons for seeking detente. 
According to Andrew Carter, the USSR's aims were to manage 
the arms race, minimize the risk of nuclear confrontation, 
and acquire time and means for economic progress.32 From 
the FRG, the Soviets sought financial credits, technological 
prowess and new markets for Soviet and East European goods. 
The Soviet Union also wanted to reduce its economic
31Helmut Schmidt, "The Federal Republic of Germany 
State of the Nation Address on 29 January 1976," Vital 
Speeches 42 (15 March 1976): 325.
32Andrew Carter, "Detente and East-West Relations: 
American Soviet and European Perspectives,11 in European 
Detente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West
Relations, ed. Kenneth Dyson (London: Frances Pinter,
1986), 61.
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assistance to the East German regime, which depended on the 
USSR for subsidies, credits, resources and military support. 
The GDR's period of isolation had forced it to become 
heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, both economically and 
politically. This isolation and dependency proved to be 
expensive for the Soviet Union, which saw the GDR as the 
necessary gateway for the exchange of West German goods from 
West to East.
The Soviets* interest in establishing better relations 
with the FRG was favorably received in West Germany. Bonn 
appeared impressed by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 
presentation before the Supreme Soviet in July 1969 in which 
he "expressed interest in improving Soviet-West German 
relations and indicated a willingness to negotiate the 
problem of West Berlin."33 Brandt knew that the road to 
East Berlin was through Moscow. The Soviet leaders had the 
military and political power to control their East German 
satellite, and Brandt hoped that by improving Soviet-West 
German relations to put pressure on the reluctant SED to 
establish official East-West German relations. In addition 
to seeking the long-term goal of reunification, Brandt 
realized the potential for achieving immediate benefits in 
the form of trade between the FRG as a producer of finished 
products and the USSR as a provider of resources. So, on 12 
August 1970, West Germany and the Soviet Union signed the
33Korbel, "Ostpolitik: I," 1056.
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Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. This treaty, also known as 
the Ostvertrage. sought to improve relations between the FRG 
and the USSR and led the way for the FRG to normalize 
relations with the GDR.
In the early 1970s, Brandt expanded Ludwig Erhard's 
Ostpolitik policy of improving West German relations with 
the USSR and the Eastern European communist states.
Brandt's policies included a Deutschlandpolitik of 
normalizing relations with the GDR and moving away from 
coexistence towards cooperation with the East. West German 
Ostpolitik repudiated the Hallstein Doctrine and "cleared 
away virtually all obstacles to the international 
recognition of the GDR."34
Although reunification was still officially an 
objective in West Germany's policy toward East Germany, 
Chancellor Brandt no longer required that the reunification 
issue or the German question be settled before relations 
between the two states could occur. As reunification became 
more unlikely and division appeared more permanent, 
normalization of relations and trade with the Eastern bloc 
nations replaced reunification as the main controlling 
element of the Federal Republic's foreign policy.
34J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule. 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 239.
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Yet while Brandt began to drop the requirement of 
reunification as the prerequisite for East-West German 
relations, Ulbricht attempted to strengthen his policy of 
limiting contacts between the two German states in order to 
prevent the Western influence which was sure to threaten the 
SED's hegemony.35 He realized that West Germany was an 
attractive and desirable place for many East Germans. 
Ulbricht feared the Soviet policy of rapprochement would 
endanger East Germany's stability by revealing the 
illegitimate nature of his regime. However, as previously 
mentioned, the USSR had decided that "the benefits of 
rapprochement with West Germany outweighed the risks of 
undermining the GDR's security."36 Clearly, the Soviet and 
East German leaders had conflicting opinions of how East 
Germany should conduct its relations with the Federal 
Republic.
Aware that the Soviet Union's demands for rapprochement
with the West would be more dangerous to the GDR than the
USSR, Ulbricht felt that his state was sacrificing more than
the Soviet Union. According to Ernest Plock:
The GDR was far less enthusiastic about the Soviet 
Union's interest in West Germany's Ostpolitik. For the 
Russians the policy of intra-European detente promised 
long-sought recognition of the Soviet Union's
35Ulbricht had already experienced the exodus of over 
three million dissatisfied East Germans to West Germany, 
which forced him to construct the Berlin Wall in August
1961.
36Ibid.
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preeminent position in Eastern Europe, but for the GDR 
it posed the danger of isolation as West Germany, the 
Soviet Union, and the Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe dealt directly with each other.37
So, despite the prospect for international recognition,
Ulbricht feared that improved and strengthened East-West
German relations would be damaging to East German interests,
or more specifically would destabilize his regime. Thus he
challenged the authority of the Soviet Union in order to
gain more political independence for the SED leaders.
Ulbricht continued to block Soviet initiatives during 1970
and 1971, obstructing rapprochement by harassing West German
transits and reducing their number to the GDR.38 He also
reiterated the SED's old demands that West Germany recognize
East Germany's sovereignty over West Berlin, acknowledge a
separate GDR citizenship, and, most importantly, grant full
recognition of East Germany as a legitimate and sovereign
state before any dialogue took place. Ulbricht even dared
to go so far as placing "the GDR's status as a developed
socialist state on the same level as that of the Soviet
Union. »39
The Soviet leaders resented the SED leader's comparison 
of the two states because the USSR considered itself to be
37Plock, 328.
38Lawrence L. Whetten, "Scope, Nature, and Change in 
Inner-German Relations," International Affairs (London) 57
(Winter 1980-81): 67.
39Plock, 324.
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the vanguard communist state and the leader of the 
international communist movement. This comparison made 
Ulbricht appear to the Soviet leaders as an extremely 
arrogant individual. By challenging the Soviet leaders, 
Ulbricht not only posed a threat to the Soviet Union's role 
as the vanguard communist country but also impeded the 
progress of East and West rapprochement.
In May 1971, the Soviet Union took steps to end the 
GDR's policy of isolation by forcing the removal of Ulbricht 
as party secretary.40 Although Ulbricht officially 
'resigned' from his post, numerous analysts suggest that his 
removal was engineered by the Soviet Union. The members of 
the SED Politburo acknowledged the supremacy of their Soviet 
patrons and realized that their own future also lay in the 
Soviets' hands. When the Soviet Politburo announced its 
disapproval of Ulbricht to the SED leaders, they knew it was 
time to follow the Soviets' lead and withdraw their
40A. James McAdams states in "The New Logic in Soviet- 
GDR Relations," Problems of Communism 37 (October 1988): 
49, that this was after numerous reassurances by Leonid 
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders had repeatedly promised 
the SED leader that Moscow would not compromise with the 
West on the Berlin issue. For the GDR to give up West 
Berlin was to concede a loss to the FRG. Thus, Ulbricht 
felt betrayed by the USSR.
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support.41 Left alone and without backing from his own 
Politburo, Ulbricht had no choice but to resign.
When the United States and the Soviet Union called 
for detente, East and West Germany responded differently. 
Whereas the FRG and Brandt were ready and willing for 
detente, the GDR under Ulbricht stubbornly objected to it. 
Ulbricht resisted the Soviet policy changes, which he felt 
gave total priority to the USSR's interests and endangered 
the GDR's stability. So, by failing to respond to the 
Soviets' demands for improved East-West German relations, 
Ulbricht presented himself as an impediment to detente and 
Soviet interests and therefore was replaced as first 
secretary in 1971. This action affirmed Soviet hegemony 
over the GDR and the SED and reinforced the illegitimacy of 
the SED regime. Thus, during the period of detente, 
external factors allowed West Germany to pursue Ostpolitik 
while compelling East Germany to respond to it. However, 
with Ulbricht gone, the new SED leader would do his best to 
limit the damage of these newly established East-West German 
relations.
41According to McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet-GDR 
Relations," 52, during the 1970s, the Soviet leader, Leonid 
Brezhnev, had managed to consolidate his power effectively 
and "judging from his central presence at the 24th CPSU 
[soviet communist party] Congress in 1971, he could have 
easily quashed any 'anti-detente' forces inclined to support 
Ulbricht's position."
CHAPTER III
OFFICIAL EAST AND WEST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1970s
With the ouster of Ulbricht as leader of the GDR, one
of the main domestic political impediments to the
improvement of East Germany's relations with the FRG was 
removed. Although the SED leaders hope that relations with 
West Germany would bolster their legitimacy, they remained 
wary of the prospects for destabilization arising from 
excessively close contact with the west. So in the 1970s, 
the SED government pursued a policy of limited expansion of, 
relations with the FRG, in hopes of reaping the benefits of 
improved intra-German contacts without incurring substantial 
costs or risks. At the same time, the East German regime 
sought to increase and strengthen its ties to the Soviet 
Union.
With Moscow's approval, Erich Honecker was elevated by 
the Central Committee of the SED to the commanding position 
of First Secretary in May 197l.42 Although he had
reservations about West Germany, Honecker did not refrain
42Eric Waldman, "The German Democratic Republic: 
Moscow's Faithful Ally," in East Central Europe: 
Yesterday. Today. Tomorrow, ed. Milorad Drachkovitch 
(Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1982), 272.
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from relations with the FRG. He realized his own political 
power rested in the hands of the Soviet leadership and that 
he had been selected because leaders of the Soviet Union 
perceived him to be more flexible and less intransigent than 
his predecessor. Therefore, Honecker implicitly followed 
the Soviet Union*s lead for better East-West relations and 
was obedient to Soviet leaders. Honecker also sought 
improved relations with the FRG for domestic political 
reasons. Unlike Ulbricht, he believed that contacts would 
bolster the legitimacy of the East German regime. The SED 
would now try to acquire legitimacy through relations with 
West Germany: "The fact that the most popular and
'legitimizing' policy for the GDR was one involving closer 
relations with the Federal Republic."43
Nevertheless, Honecker, as his predecessor Ulbricht, 
feared the destabilizing consequences of Western penetration 
into East German society. He initiated the policy of 
Abarenzuna. which emphasized that "contact with the Federal 
Republic should be accompanied by an intensification of the 
class war to ensure that the East German population is 
uncontaminated by 'bourgeois influences.1"44 Honecker's 
policy was aimed at blocking any West German influence that
43Brown, 99.
44W. T. Jones, "East Germany Under Honecker," World 
Today (London) 32 (September 1976): 339.
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might destabilize the East German regime. German expert
Henry Krisch explains Honecker's tactics:
With few exceptions, it has been the Honecker 
leadership's policy to sever the ties, both substantive 
and symbolic, that might tie the people of East Germany 
to a larger Germany. Thus East Germany believes that 
the 'German question'. . .  no longer exists.45
In a sense, Honecker's Abarenzung was similar to his
predecessor's policy but was hidden behind the mirage of
closer relations to the FRG.
Two agreements flowed from Ostpolitik that expanded
East and West German relations and increased West Germany's
influence on East Germany.46 First came the 1971 Berlin
Accords, or Quadripartite Agreement, signed in September by
the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain and France.
The Berlin Accords reaffirmed West Berlin's ties to the
West? allowed for West Berliners to make regular visits to
East Berlin and the GDR; and promoted the development of
traffic and transportation discussions between the FRG and
West Berlin.47 The accords failed to provide East German
sovereignty over West Berlin and forced the SED to concede
West Germany's control over territory within the GDR.
45Henry Krisch, "The German Democratic Republic in the 
Mid 1970s," Current History 70 (March 1976): 120.
46FRG Chancellor Brandt and GDR President Willy Stoph
laid the groundwork for the GDR-FRG treaties through their
1970 meetings in Kassel and Erfurt.
47Brown, 241, and Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany. East 
and West: Conflicts. Collaboration and Confrontation. (New
York: New York University Press, 1981), 107.
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The next important agreement, ending the GDR's 
international isolation, was reached in November 1972, when 
the GDR and the FRG signed the Basic Treaty or 
Grundvertrag.48 This treaty allowed the GDR to achieve de 
facto recognition from Bonn, to get full recognition from 
the world (in 1973, both German states joined the United 
Nations), and permitted its citizens to have freer travel. 
However, the GDR failed to obtain the FRG's recognition of 
specific GDR citizenship, as well as full diplomatic 
recognition. The two governments exchanged only 
representatives (permanent missions) and not ambassadors.
Brandt's Government maintained throughout the Basic 
Treaty negotiations that the Federal Republic's relations 
with the GDR were of a special nature and were not the same 
as those with foreign countries. According to the FRG, the 
GDR was not seen as a foreign state and Bonn rejected the 
idea of a full, internationally valid recognition of East 
Germany. Brandt offered the recognition of two separate 
German states without sacrificing the idea of one German 
nation. He continued to stress the importance of self- 
determination and free will for all German people. In 
essence, Brandt was trying to hold open the possibility of 
eventual reunification at the same time that he extended 
partial recognition.
48According to Plock, 5, the United States, Great 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union intervened continuously 
in the East and West German negotiations.
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Simultaneously, while East Germany was establishing 
relations with the Federal Republic, the SED sought to 
construct closer ties with the Soviet Union. Honecker 
supported the Soviet Union as the vanguard leader of the 
socialist community of states, stating in May 1974, "We [GDR 
and USSR] agree on all political, ideological, and basic 
theoretical questions of social development."49 The GDR 
continued to foster closer ties to the Soviet Union by 
signing the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid in October 
1975.
One important reason for strengthening relations with 
the Soviets was Honecker's desire to make the two nations 
increasingly economically interdependent. Not only did the 
USSR provide East Germany with most of its raw materials, 
but the Soviet Union also granted many trade subsidies to 
the GDR. In return, East Germany provided the USSR with 
many finished products and access to Western markets. 
Honecker hoped to make the GDR economically indispensable to 
the Soviet Union, thereby forcing the Soviet Union to 
continue providing military and economic support to the SED 
regime.50
Another reason Honecker sought better relations was to
49Stephen Bowers, "Continuity and Contrast: Honecker's
Policy Toward the Federal Republic and West Berlin," World 
Affairs 138 (Spring 1976): 324.
50Karl Cordell, "Soviet Attitudes Toward the German 
Democratic Republic," Political Quarterly 61 (July/September 
1990): 285.
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prevent the West from influencing the GDR*s citizens. 
According to Peter Bender, the Grundvertraa forced East 
Germany to admit a threatening competitor into its state.51 
Now, East Germans would be confronted with a state whose 
political system was based on popular support, and Honecker 
feared that detente would increase the GDR's vulnerability 
to the seductions of the West.52 Honecker hoped that by 
establishing stronger East German-Soviet relations, the 
Soviet Union's ideology, rather than West Germany's, would 
be absorbed by the East Germans.
Detente brought both East and West German societies 
closer through various means. Guidelines for transportation 
of goods between the two German states were created. The 
exchange of media personnel occurred; of course, the GDR set 
restrictions on the kind and amount of news that could be 
reported but it did allow West German journalists to operate 
in East Germany. Communications between Germans were 
improved by increasing the number of telephone lines and 
postal services available. Perhaps even more importantly, 
detente reinforced the obvious fact that both states 
contained Germans who shared many common things: the German
language, beliefs, traditions, ideas, values, family and 
friends. George Kennan observed that Germans believe in
51Peter Bender, "The Special Relationship of the Two 
German States," World Today (London) 29 (September 1973): 
389-90.
52Ibid. , 389.
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what he coined "romantic linguistic nationalism” in which a 
common tongue creates a community.53
Nonetheless, despite all these commonalities, the two 
German states did not share a common system of government. 
The East German regime tried desperately to emphasize and 
reinforce the differences between the two German states 
through demarcation. Fearing the destabilizing influences 
of West German society, Honecker perpetuated Ulbricht's 1961 
'two-culture' doctrine which stated that "East and West 
Germany belonged to two entirely separate cultural spheres, 
one progressive and humanistic, the other reactionary and 
imperialistic."54 The East German communists saw the FRG's 
cultural policy as antagonistic, whose purpose was to 
destroy the socialist order.55 The SED attempted to 
downplay the common cultural and historical ties with West 
Germany and sought to stress the GDR's socialist 
distinctions and the superiority of a social welfare 
state.56 In 1971, the SED's chief ideologist Kurt Hager 
asserted in a speech that Marxist-Leninism and the supremacy
53Michael Meyer, "The Myth of German Unity: Divisions
Between East and West Will Persist," Newsweek 9 July 1990, 
37.
540rlow, 331.
55Eberhard Schulz, ed., GDR: Foreign Policy. (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982), 161.
56Griffith, 242.
42
of the working class and party were to be emphasized.57 
The SED intensified its communist propaganda in an attempt 
at self-legitimation and to counter any Western ideas which 
penetrated East German society.
Once again, external factors in the form of Soviet and 
West German pressures affected the policies of the East 
German regime. In the end, the GDR exchanged a foreign 
policy gain for a domestic policy loss. Although the SED 
did gain international recognition by most states, it now 
was forced to accept the consequences of West German 
penetration into East German society. Honecker realized the 
potential damage that West German influence could bring to 
East Germany. So, although Honecker was unable to prevent 
Western infiltration, he sought to control and manage it 
through his policy of Abarenzuna. which included 
strengthening ties to the Soviet Union while minimizing 
relations with West Germany. However, as revealed in the 
next chapter, Western penetration continued to delegitimize 
Honecker1s SED regime.
57J o n e s , 3 4 0 .
CHAPTER IV
WEST GERMAN PENETRATION INTO EAST GERMANY
The penetration of Western ideas into the GDR was 
furthered by detente, Ostpolitik, and the Basic Treaty. The 
introduction of Western democratic and free-market concepts 
presented economic, social and political alternatives to 
East Germany’s repressive and restrictive communist system. 
It is apparent that foreign contact with the Western states 
through financial, human and technical exchanges intensified 
East Germans1 dissatisfaction with their communist 
controlled state and reinforced the illegitimate nature of 
the SED government.
The first form of penetration was economic. Before the 
conclusion of the Basic Treaty of 1972, intra-German trade 
did exist. The Frankfurt Agreement of October 1949 and the 
Berlin Agreement of September 1951 provided a foundation for 
trade between the two states.58 Following these agreements 
came the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the 
European Common Market in which the FRG insisted that the 
GDR be included. The inclusion of the GDR extended "Bonn's 
right to treat West German-East German trade as an inter-
58Korbel, "Ostpolitik: I," 1064.
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zonal arrangement” which would allow the East's exports to 
enter into the West free of customs duties.59
For different reasons, both governments placed 
considerable importance on intra-German trade. For the 
Federal Republic trade was both a political and moral issue. 
Despite the conventional wisdom that West German leaders 
wanted to use trade as a bargaining leverage to achieve 
reunification, it was not used as one, at least not in the 
short term. The GDR continued to receive economic benefits 
without being forced to make any substantial concessions to 
the FRG. Of course in the long term, the ultimate West 
German goal was to use trade and personal contacts to 
penetrate East German society in order to pave the way for 
reunification. But until the reunification, the Federal 
Republic felt a moral obligation to help the Germans living 
in the GDR. Essentially, the FRG sought to improve the 
quality of life for the East Germans through enhancing the 
flow of economic resources between the two Germanies.
East Germany, on the other hand, needed intra-German 
trade for both economic and political reasons. Relations 
with the FRG were critical to the GDR's economic prosperity 
which in turn, helped to maintain the regime's political 
stability. The SED regime's effort to gain legitimacy 
depended on its ability to satisfy its claim of the GDR 
being a separate and superior —  economically as well as
59Ibid. , 1065.
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politically —  German state. According to Henry Krisch,
economic growth was used as the major legitimating device
for the SED regime.60 Therefore, the GDR had to provide
the people with a standard of living which was at least
greater than that in other socialist countries. Honecker
knew this and throughout his tenure sought to increase the
standard of living for East Germans by stressing a more
consumer-oriented policy. This pro-consumer policy, which
Honecker initiated at the 8th Party Congress of the SED in
1971, set out to increase the standard of living and the
number of goods available for sale in the GDR. As Krisch
states, although communist regimes, such as the GDR, "may
not strive for legitimate acceptance by the whole
population, they do seek to evoke legitimate responses from
ever-larger numbers of people.”61 So, the SED intended to
use economic policies to gain popular support.
The numerous benefits provided by the FRG helped
maintain the GDR1s economic achievements:
West German subsidies of the East German economy [came] 
in the form of credits, visa, toll payments, 
construction assistance, private transfers, trade, and 
other forms of assistance [including the swing credit 
or an interest-free loan which allowed East Germany to 
avoid paying hard currency for many West German 
imports] ,62
60Krisch, "Political Legitimation," 115.
61Ibid., 113.
62Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Reform: 
The Great Challenge. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 114-15.
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Special currency terms provided by the FRG to the GDR which 
equated one Ostmark to one Deutschemark (DM) also helped 
bolster the GDR's economy. In addition, the West German 
government paid cash to the SED regime in exchange for the 
freedom of some East German dissidents. According to West 
German sources, from 1962 to 1979, approximately 16,000 GDR 
prisoners were purchased by West Germany for over $5 million 
in cash and goods.63
Furthermore, the introduction of the Deutschemark into 
East Germany provided additional income for the SED regime. 
The GDR government went so far as to create hard currency 
stores called "Intershops" which only accepted payments in 
Deutschemarks and brought in an estimated 700-800 million DM 
annually to the GDR.64 The Deutschemark became a second 
currency for the GDR and in some transactions was the only 
acceptable currency.
The FRG also provided East Germany with technological 
improvements. In fact, one of the major reasons the Soviet 
leaders called for detente was because of the need for 
economic modernization in the USSR and in its satellites, 
which they felt could be achieved through technological 
means. According to analyst Andrew Carter, "increased 
access to Western technology could give the planned
63Richard Starr, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe.
4th ed., (Stanford: Hoover Press Publications, 1982), 112.
64Waldman, 277.
economies a short cut to modernization that would lessen the 
need for structural reform."65 Under Honecker, in the 
GDR's highly centralized economy, substantial systemic 
reforms did not take place. Although economic changes were 
introduced in the 1970s, these changes were geared to fine- 
tuning the socialist system, not changing it. Instead of 
systemic reform, the GDR sought to bolster its economy 
through "more diversified trade with the industrialized and 
technologically developed West."66 Soon after signing the 
Basic Treaty, the FRG became the GDR's second largest 
trading partner (after the Soviet Union) and supplied East 
Germany with hi-tech goods and information.
West German economic contacts certainly bolstered the 
performance of the GDR's economy, which appeared strong and 
healthy on the surface. In fact, the Soviet and the SED 
leaderships claimed that the GDR was an economic miracle, 
and that was also the conventional wisdom adhered to by 
Westerners. Up until the mid-1980s, the social contract 
between the government and the people (which guaranteed the 
workers a secure, non-competitive work environment with wage 
increases in return for political compliance) seemed 
successful on the surface. However, the truth was that the 
GDR's economic situation was not as favorable as it
65Carter, 59.
66Korbel, "Ostpolitik: II," 341.
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appeared.67 In the end, West German economic contacts 
could not prop up an increasingly inefficient planned 
economy.
The GDR*s economic system faltered for several reasons. 
First, the GDR was vulnerable to external economic 
destabilization. In the mid-1970s, the drastic fluctuations 
in oil-prices, U.S. inflation and Soviet stagnation created 
an undesirable economic climate for the GDR. By the late 
1970s, the Soviet Union could no longer continue to provide 
as many economic concessions to the GDR, which made it 
increasingly difficult for the SED regime to maintain its 
consumer-oriented economic policy. Furthermore, according 
to Doris Cornelson of the German Institute for Economic 
Research in Berlin, "the world-wide increase in raw 
materials and energy prices only too quickly put an end to 
this [the GDR's] period of undisturbed economic 
development."68 So, East Germany had to pay more for its 
imports while its prices for export items did not rise 
accordingly. The SED regime had become a hostage to 
economic forces that were beyond its control.
67Many analysts question the accuracy and credibility 
of the economic figures that the East German state provided 
to the West.
68Doris Cornelson, "The GDR in a Period of Foreign 
Trade Difficulties: Development and Prospects for the
1980's," in East European Economic Assessment: Part 1 -
Country Studies. 1980. by the Joint Economic Committee 1981, 
299-300.
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In addition to external shocks, the GDR suffered from 
internal economic distortions arising from problems within 
the GDR's central planning system. The basic nature of the 
planning system led to its failure for numerous reasons: 1) 
it focused on quantity not quality and therefore produced 
low-quality goods; 2) it promoted politically reliable but 
economically inept managers with its nomenklatura list? 3) 
it granted egalitarian wages and job security and thus 
failed to provide incentives; 4) it encouraged managers to 
set low targets for production? 5) it was extremely wasteful 
in the utilization of resources? and 6) it offered no 
competition or competitive elements. In addition, the East 
German economy suffered from the same repressed inflation, 
under-investment and price distortions as the other 
communist bloc nations.
The problems of central planning led East Germans to 
turn to an alternative route. Their interests became 
focused on a second (black) market which damaged the already 
fragile, official one. While the black market benefitted 
the East German consumer by providing goods not available on 
the official East German market, the GDR suffered the 
consequences. First, many of the goods were stolen state 
properties and East Germany did not profit from the 
transactions. Second, the exchanges of currency were not 
taxed and revenue was lost for the GDR. Third, the option 
to buy higher quality Western goods reduced the number of
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East German goods purchased, and once again, the state lost 
revenue. Finally, the official economy lost worker 
productivity as East German workers turned to the black 
market for income and failed to show up at work.
In addition to the destabilizing effects created by the 
black market came the effects of the increasing influx of 
West German Deutschemarks. In fact, the DM ultimately 
proved destabilizing because it dealt a debilitating blow to 
the East Germans by making them conscious of the fact that 
their currency was inferior to the West German mark. This 
reality reinforced the illegitimate nature of the SED regime 
along with its propaganda of being a superior economic 
state.
So, although the GDR appeared successful by East 
European economic standards, it could not compete with West 
Germany's progress. The East German population continued to 
compare its successes with those of the FRG, and the GDR 
lagged far behind the FRG in most areas. According to one 
report, the GDR trailed behind the FRG in many consumer 
goods:
Table 1.— standard of Living in FRG and GDR 69
FRG GDR
per capital income 20,000 H O o o
newspapers 125 39
own cars 97% 25%
own phones 98/100 7/100
color t.v. 94% 52%
69,lReport on GDR," C-Span News, 11 April 1990, 4 p.m.
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In the GDR, where success was measured by economic 
achievement, the numbers revealed that Honecker's brand of 
consumer-socialism could not compete with the FRG. This 
fact carried delegitimizing implications for the SED regime 
and its proclamations of the superiority of its economic 
system. With the FRG1s successful economic penetration into 
East German society, the East Germans discovered that they 
were being deprived of consumer goods and services which 
were readily available in western nations.
West German social and political penetration came in 
various forms. The first form of penetration was the 
exchange of travellers, both East and West.70 As West 
Germans travelled to the GDR, they were able to share with 
the East Germans their stories, ideas and values.71 In 
return, beginning in late 1964, a limited number of East 
Germans, mostly elderly, were allowed to travel to the West 
and see the world on the other side of the Wall for 
themselves.72 The SED regime allowed the exchange of 
visitors primarily for economic reasons. The communist 
regime received money from individuals entering East
70The number of East Germans travelling westward was 
far less than the number of West Germans travelling 
eastward. The GDR also restricted travel for youths while 
tolerating travel for pensioners.
71Brown reports, 252, that in 1979 some eight million 
West Germans travelled to East Germany.
72According to Brown, 239, by 1987, one million East 
Germans had visited and experienced the FRG.
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Germany, as well as from the West German government for 
allowing East and West Germans travel privileges.73 Yet 
although the exchange of visitors brought economic benefits 
to the GDR, it violated the basic intention of the Berlin 
Wall which was to keep out Western influences.74
The second form of Western penetration came via 
literature, radio, and television. Although the SED 
government strictly prohibited "the importation of printed 
material of nonsocialist origin," West German social and 
political literature was still circulated through various 
circles.75 This type of penetration was perhaps the 
easiest type for the SED leaders to control since they 
decided what would and would not be imported into the GDR.
Due to the technological advances in communications, 
Western influences via the air waves, such as radio and 
television, were more difficult to control. East Germany 
received not only West German radio programs but also the 
pro-democratic programs aired by Voice of America and Radio 
Free Europe. Now, the East Germans heard news reports which
^Of course, there was a price for West Germans to pay. 
Since 1964, West Germans had to exchange, at a rate of one 
to one, their West German Deutschemark for the less valuable 
East German Ostmark.
74In November 1973 and October 1980, the SED regime 
doubled the amount of the visitors entrance fee. According
to Bowers, 320, this move "raised Western suspicions that 
the real intention of this action was to reduce the number 
of Wester visitors coming to the GDR."
^Waldman, 279.
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offered political, social and economic alternatives for them 
to compare to their local ones.
Television, however, made the greatest impression on 
East German society. Although reluctant at first, by the 
mid-1970s Honecker abandoned his effort to prevent East 
Germans from viewing West German television, and by 1989 he 
had made it accessible to all East Germans.76 The possible 
impact of Western television seems obvious.
Analyst J. F. Brown suggests several reasons why 
Honecker tolerated television: it would be technically
difficult to block the reception of West German programs and 
even if it could be done, it would be a self-inflicting 
propaganda defeat to do so? the East Germans hopefully would 
view West German television to be condemning the Western 
lifestyle; and finally, the acceptance of West German 
television was a gesture of the regime's understanding for 
the FRG society and showed the communists' confidence in 
their ability to withstand any ill effects.77
To counter any disturbances that television might 
bring, Honecker reacted by increasing the levels of 
communist propaganda. Nevertheless, even the SED elite 
watched West German television and used it for their main
76Tara Sonenshine, "The Revolution Has Been Televised,"
the Washington Post. 2 October 1990, 19(A).
^Brown, 253.
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source of entertainment and news.78 Despite the
government's efforts to contain the impact of Western
television, it appeared that East German propaganda had
little affect on the GDR's citizens. As T. H. Rigby
acknowledges:
The unintended consequences of . . . technological 
changes may not only generate 'undesirable' indigenous 
changes in social beliefs and values but render society 
more open and receptive to beliefs and values current 
in the non-communist world, primarily those of 
'bourgeois' origin.79
Television only reinforced the illegitimate nature of
Honecker's regime by presenting the East Germans with
alternate choices.
Honecker underestimated television's potential impact
on his fellow East German viewers. This technology provided
the East Germans with a view of life outside the wall.
Through television, the East German population could view
the changes and reforms occurring in other nations. They
watched glasnost in the USSR under the radical Gorbachev;
they saw the possibility of free elections in Hungary and
Poland. A worker from Leipzig remarked: "We saw what
Poland and Hungary were doing; we heard Gorbachev. Everyone
felt, Why are we being left behind?"80 West German
78C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East 
Germany. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 128.
79Rigby, 18.
80Karsten Prager, A State, Not a Nation," Time, 27 
November 1989, 41.
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television even allowed the East Germans to view themselves 
protesting. During the celebration of the GDR's fortieth 
anniversary as an independent state, policemen beat several 
hundred East German government protestors. That same 
evening, the violent acts were aired back to East Germans 
through West German television.
West German television also undermined the SED 
government's legitimacy by appealing to what A. J. McAdams 
calls the East Germans "pent-up consumerism."81 Despite 
the SED regime's confidence, West Germany's way of life 
proved to be more attractive to East Germans and 
"inevitably, the West German popular and consumer culture 
began to play an insidious and important role in East German 
life, countering both communist ideology and the GDR's 
separate pretentions."82 Coinciding with the East Germans' 
growing material aspirations came the SED regime's 
difficulties in sustaining increases in living standards for 
the population. This created legitimacy problems for 
Honecker who could not satisfy the heightened expectations 
of the population.83
West German media penetration also frustrated the 
GDR's attempts to restructure the German culture into two 
separate and distinct cultures, and thereby failed to shore
81 As quoted in Sonenshine, 19(A).
82Brown, 253.
83Krisch, "Political Legitimacy," 114.
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up the SED's legitimacy. As analyst Ernest Plock suggests, 
attempts to maintain a separate East German culture were 
doomed by the West German media: HTo be sure, these efforts
at cultural isolation failed. The common language and ready 
availability of West Germany radio and television in most 
parts of the GDR assured that news from the West would 
continue to reach East Germany."84 By the early 1980s, not 
only West Germany but now East Germany respected the notion 
of a common German people, and German nationalism surged. , 
Honecker's attempt at deGermanization had failed. As West 
German Bundestag member Walther Kiep observed: "The quest
for new ideals and opportunities for personal identification 
[wa]s leading Germans back to their own history and public 
discussion of 'national awareness,1 'homeland,'
'fatherland,' and 'nation.'85 By 1983, when East Germany 
celebrated the 500th birthday of Martin Luther and 
acknowledged a history similar to West Germany's, the 
earlier doctrine of two Germanies with two different 
histories was "visibly disavowed."86
The influx of West German citizens, literature, radio 
and television into the GDR provided the East Germans with 
options not available in the closed communist society. On a
84Plock, 331.
85Kiep, 316.
86Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," 
Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 312.
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1980 Fellowship in Berlin Lucy Komisar reported that few, if 
any, East Germans believed the SED's communist propaganda 
anymore.87 By tolerating West German penetration, the 
Honecker regime allowed the East German population to see 
that the West Germans possessed things that they lacked: 
independent wealth; freedom of travel and expression; the 
right to protest against their government's policies; and 
the opportunity to make decisions about their lifestyles 
independent from the state's desires. Political scientist 
Karen Dawisha theorized that the attractiveness of Marxism- 
Leninism would be reduced so long as it was the West and not 
the USSR setting the standards of human rights, consumer 
welfare and technological competence.88
In sum, the combination of economic, human and 
technological West German penetration weakened the SED 
regime and prevented it from gaining legitimacy, impelling 
it to maintain itself solely through force. It appeared 
that without force, the regime could certainly collapse. 
Certainly Honecker realized the adverse consequences that 
this Western penetration could bring. At the same time, he 
also realized the advantages. Therefore, Honecker tried to 
manage and control the amount of West German influence in 
East German society. However, after viewing the effects of
87L. Komisar, "Cold War News in West Germany," Nation 
2 30 (5 January 198 0): 11.
88Dawisha, 24.
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West German penetration on East Germany, it is evident 
Honecker failed to shield East Germans from life in the 
democratic, capitalist country and also failed in his 
propaganda attempts to prove the GDR's superiority over the 
FRG. These failures helped erode the SED regime's control 
over the thoughts and actions of its people and thus added 
to the regime's illegitimacy.
CHAPTER V
GERMAN DETENTE: 1980s
In the early 1970s, when the Soviet leadership pressed 
for detente, the SED regime initially resisted. By the 
early 1980s their positions had reversed, and now the SED 
leaders were pushing for continued detente over the USSR's 
objection. Although Honecker had reservations concerning 
detente, he was also convinced that the improving 
relationship with West Germany brought substantial benefits 
to the GDR. In his opinion, the benefits of the 
relationship outweighed the risks. At the same time, 
Honecker believed that the GDR had become an indispensable 
economic asset to the Soviet Union and therefore felt 
justified in continuing the inner-German dialogue. So, 
despite the United States and the Soviet Union's 
increasingly antagonistic relationship, the East and West 
German governments succeeded in maintaining their bilateral 
relationship.
Soviet-American detente began to wither as early as 
1975. Tensions mounted when the Soviets began a series of 
proxy wars in Africa and the Near East. The era of detente 
finally ended with a series of international events: the
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979? NATO's 1979 
announcement of its dual-track policy which would bring 
cruise and Pershing 2 missiles to the FRG; and the 
imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. Yet despite 
the intensification of East-West tensions and the USSR's 
demands for its East European allies to reduce their 
relations with the western, democratic nations, Honecker's 
regime managed to preserve its ties to the Federal Republic. 
As early as February 1980, Schmidt and Honecker officially 
"exchanged reassurances that the erosion of detente at the 
bilateral great power level should not affect relations 
between the two Germanies. "89
Both economic and political factors provided the 
rationale behind Erich Honecker's desires to continue the 
little detente with West Germany. Economic motivations 
played a critical role in Honecker's decision to pursue 
conciliatory policies with the FRG as the GDR benefitted 
disproportionately from the inner-German economic 
relationship.90 To begin with, the GDR relied heavily on 
the FRG as a trading partner. By the early 1980s, West 
Germany's trade with the GDR was about 2 percent of the 
FRG's total imports and exports, while East Germany's trade
89Whetten, "Scope, Nature, and Change in Inner-German 
Relations," 75.
90This is not to say that the FRG did not benefit from 
the economic relationship but that its importance was■ 
limited.
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with the FRG was about 12 percent of the GDR's total foreign 
trade.91 Honecker believed that this economic relationship 
was vital to the health and stability of the SED government 
because it helped forestall discontent among the East German 
population. The SED regime hoped that the inner-German 
relationship would diminish the increasing economic gap 
between East and West Germany, and thereby increase its 
indigenous support.
The GDR relied on the FRG for a number of services and 
goods and was reluctant to renounce these economic benefits. 
Each year, the SED leaders sought to gain more credits from 
the FRG. A. J. McAdams reported in 1983 that the GDR's 
foreign debt, of Which nearly half was owed directly or 
indirectly to the FRG, had risen to almost $13 billion.92 
After COMECON, West Germany was the most important export 
market for the GDR. And German political analyst Lawrence 
Whetten claims that the GDR's trade with other Western 
nations was falling, citing: "This sharp decline in trade
with other Western countries . . . has been offset to some 
extent by marginal increases in German trade."93
91 Jonathan Dean, "Directions in Inner-German 
Relations," Orbis 29 (Fall 1985), 623.
92A. J. McAdams, "Bridging the German Divide in a Time 
of Tension," New Leader 66 (3 October 1983), 10.
93Whetten, "Scope, Nature and Change in Inner-German 
Relations," 73.
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Furthermore, the East Germans suffered from their raw 
materials dependency on the Soviet Union. Since 1981, the 
Soviet Union had hit East Germany with increased petroleum 
prices as the result of inflation and the world economic 
downturn.94 As the USSR reduced its supplies and subsidies 
to the GDR, the SED government could not afford to reduce 
its trade relationship with the Federal Republic. The 
economic loss would be too great. According to one source, 
the GDR received an annual estimated hard currency gain of 
DM 5 billion from the inner-German relationship.95
So, although Honecker recognized and tried to manage 
the potentially destabilizing effects the improving inner- 
German relationship brought to the GDR, he also realized how 
economic prosperity would advance his consumer-oriented 
policy and continue his regime stability. Honecker 
obviously thought that the economic benefits gained from the 
inner-German trade relationship outweighed the possible 
consequences that increased West German contact with East 
German society brought.
Political reasons for continuing the inner-German 
dialogue played a role for both the East and West German 
regimes. The West German government and population still 
spoke of reunification. In the ideal world of politics 
reunification was the goal; however, in the realistic world
94Dean, 623.
95Ibid. , 617.
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of politics, reunification, considering the relationship of
the superpowers at the time, seemed impossible. As Richard
Lowenthal states:
The immense majority of Germans have long realized that 
such reunification could only happen if all Europe were 
reunited by the release of the East European nations 
from Soviet control.96
Nevertheless, this did not prevent West Germans from
continuing to hope for reunification. The cultural
similarities between the two states continued to reaffirm a
common German heritage. Although the circumstances were not
right for reunification, Germans still aspired towards it as
a long term goal.
Honecker also had a political motivation for continuing
the inner-German detente. He sought to maintain his
stability at home. As long as East Germany continued to
trade with West Germany, Honecker believed his citizens
would remain submissive; however, if he reduced inner-
German relations, it could stir up unrest. As West German
government official Walther Kiep noted: "The East German
communists ha[d] failed to bring about any general
acceptance of its claim to legitimacy in the German
context", and they saw the inner-German relationship as one
way to get it.97
96Lowenthal, 304.
97Kiep, 322.
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While East and West Germany continued their 
relationship, strains grew in US-USSR relations. As the 
American-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) 
missile conflict emerged, distrust and hostility between the 
two superpowers deepened. In retaliation against the 
deployment of Soviet SS-2 0 intermediate nuclear range 
weapons in Europe and East Asia, the Carter Administration 
introduced NATO's dual-track policy. With this policy, the 
US government sought to establish negotiations with the 
Soviets regarding their build up of SS-20s in Eastern 
Europe, while continuing with plans to position Pershing 2 
and cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe. Both East 
and West Germany were to receive missiles from their 
respective alliance partners and were expected to follow 
their allies' wishes of down-playing the inter-German 
relationship; however, both German regimes wished to 
continue their bilateral relationship and attempted to 
detach it from the Soviet-American arms race.
In October 1982, the Christian Democrats (CDU), led by 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, replaced the Social Democrats (SPD) 
as the leading partner in West Germany's new CDU/CSU-FDP 
coalition government. During their thirteen year absence 
from power, the Christian Democrats had been extremely 
critical of the Social Democrats Deutschlandoolitik. The 
conservatives complained that the Social Democrats granted 
too many concessions to the East German regime while
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receiving few in return. Now, the new Center-Right
coalition claimed it would seek more advantages for West
Germany from East Germany in the form of humanitarian
concessions by the SED government. However, under Kohl's
leadership, West Germany's Deutschlandoolitik appeared quite
similar to that of his predecessors. Besides continuing to
foster ties with East Germany and acknowledging all past
treaties, Kohl's objectives included "the all-German aspects
of the FRG's national ideology and included the theme of
reunification and self-determination of the German
people."98 The Christian Democrats realized that detente
brought good things to both Germanies. According to
political scientist A. J. McAdams:
Detente gave them [West Germans] a much desired avenue 
to the reunification of long separated families, to 
substantial increases in communications, and above all, 
to the opening of routine contacts among citizens of 
the divided nation.99
Chancellor Kohl also realized that by continuing the 
policies originated by the Social Democrats, the Christian 
Democrats would reduce the SPD's opportunities to criticize 
his government and policies. The SPD's past policies had 
proved popular with West Germans. Chancellor Kohl did not 
wish to alter them and risk the popularity of his regime. 
Thus, despite the worsening of superpower relations, policy
98Frey, 111.
"McAdams, "Bridging the German Divide," 10.
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continuity actually helped carry on and even improve 
relations between the two German states.100
In East Germany, Honecker followed the Soviet Union's 
lead and voiced anti-missile rhetoric about the United 
States and its allies. Two months before the West German 
Bundestag's 22 November 1983 vote to accept US missiles, the 
East German communist leader warned of a possible "ice age" 
in inter-German relations. However, after the vote,
Honecker abandoned his threats and took a more accommodating 
approach. Emphasizing the need to "limit" any damage 
resulting from the Bundestag's decision, he left "open the 
possibility of a return to detente."101 Honecker, like 
Kohl, wanted to maintain the inter-German relationship. 
According to Jonathan Dean, an American negotiator on the 
1971 Berlin Agreement, "the Kohl-Honecker collaboration to 
try to salvage the inner-German relation and even to 
intensity [sic] it . . . received overwhelming approval from 
the public in both German states."102 Both German 
populations wanted to continue the benefits gained through 
detente and persisted in hoping for reunification.
100According to Ronald Asmus, "East and West Germany: 
Continuity and Change," World Today (London) 40 (April 
1984), 145, Soviet-American relations worsened with "the 
shooting down by the Russians of the Korean airliner, the 
continuing stalemate in Geneva, and the American invasion of 
Grenada."
101Ibid. , 149.
102Dean, 621-22.
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In addition East and West Germans shared the widespread 
fear of a nuclear holocaust. The GDR represented the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization’s front-line state and the FRG 
represented NATO’s front-line state, making both states 
first to suffer during an attack. President Reagan's 
commitment to the possibility of conducting a limited 
nuclear war in Europe intensified East and West German 
anxieties.103 Neither state wished to be the battleground 
for the Americans and Soviets to act out their disputes.
So, despite the collapse of superpower talks on the 
intermediate-range nuclear forces in November 1983, the 
arrival of missiles in West Germany, and the deployment of 
new Soviet short range missiles in both the GDR and 
Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany continued their own 
detente.104 Both Germanies sought peace and believed that 
it was their duty to ensure it. The leaders claimed that 
international peace would continue only if they made the 
effort. East and West German leaders hoped to set a 
peaceful example for their respective alliances to follow.
Meanwhile, the Soviets reacted harshly towards the 
Federal Republic for attempting to strengthen its special 
relationship with the GDR. They charged the FRG with 
aggressive behavior and "revanchism," which political
103Frey, 78.
104Edwina Moreton, "All Quiet on the German Front? 
Germany in the Post-detente Era," Government and Opposition 
19 (Autumn 1984): 441.
scientist Arthur Hanhardt, Jr. defines as "a code word for 
alleged West German efforts to alter the status quo in post- 
World War II Europe."105 The Soviet leaders claimed that 
Kohl was attempting to use economic incentives to lure the 
East German state into the capitalist world. In June of 
1983 and July of 1984, the GDR received private bank loans, 
guaranteed for the first time by the West German government, 
of DM 1 billion ($370 million) and DM 950 million ($330 
million).106 Thus, the Soviet leaders felt that the FRG 
and GDR were strengthening relations behind their back.
Nor did the SED regime escape Soviet criticism for its 
part in the inner-German dialogue. Articles appeared in the 
Soviet Pravda and Izvestia in July and August 1984 
criticizing Honecker for continuing discussions with the 
West German government and for accepting loans from the FRG 
which could undermine the SED governments stability.107 
Nevertheless, Honecker disregarded the Soviet criticism 
directed at his regime and continued with plans for a future 
visit to West Germany. According to Hanhardt, "East
105Arthur M. Hanhardt Jr., "The Prospects for German- 
German Detente," Current History 83 (November 1984): 380.
106During the inter-German negotiations, CSU leader 
Frank Josef Strauss represented the FRG. Before the loan 
agreements, Strauss was a predominant critic of the SPD's 
past policy which provided economic aid to the GDR without 
strings. Ironically, when the loans were made to the GDR,
it was revealed that there were few, if any, real 
concessions made by the SED.
107Hanhardt, 380.
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Germany's SED leaders reacted with cool determination.
Neues, Deutschland and the provincial East German press 
refused to publish the full texts of the Soviet 
broadsides."108 Honecker's disregard for the Soviets' 
propaganda was a measure of how much East Germany had come 
to depend on its relationship with West Germany. In a 
matter of a few years, Honecker, who at first had doubts 
about contacts with the West Germans, now insisted on 
defying the Soviets and conducting business with the West 
Germans.
Honecker ignored Soviet pressure to back away from 
autonomous relations with the FRG. The SED leader was able 
to withstand Soviet pressure for several reasons. According 
to A. J. McAdams, Honecker*s strong position in the 
Politburo and foreign and domestic policy successes (good 
relations with FRG and the economy in an upswing) enabled 
him to consolidate his power at home.109 At the same time, 
the USSR's leadership was weak due to the deaths of Leonid 
Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and the incompetent administration 
under Konstantin Chernenko. Also, the East German regime 
was receiving tacit support from other Eastern European 
states— Poland, Hungary, Romania and sometimes Bulgaria—
108Ibid. , 388.
109McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations," 52.
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states which benefitted economically from the inner-German 
relationship.110
There remains little doubt that Soviet influence over 
East Germany had begun to wane by the early 1980s. When the 
conservative Soviet Ambassador, Abrassimov, was removed from 
the GDR in July 1983 and replaced by a German expert, 
Kotchemassov, it appeared that the Soviet leadership was 
allowing Honecker more autonomy in conducting East Germany's 
affairs with West Germany. On the other hand, it would be a 
mistake to assert that the GDR had gained complete autonomy 
from Soviet influence in the realm of inner-German policy. 
For example, the USSR did manage to force Honecker to 
postpone his visit to West Germany in 1984.111 The Soviets 
felt that this visit would affirm approval of the INF 
deployment and be construed as acceptance of the new NATO- 
WTO status quo.112 The Soviet leaders believed that
110Moreton, 448.
111According to Dean, 612-13, the USSR had Honecker 
announce old demands, also known as the 1980 Gera Demands, 
as the reason for his postponement. These demands read as 
follows: First, the SED sought for West Germany to respect
a separate East German citizenship; second, the SED wanted 
to make the GDR and the FRG's permanent missions into 
diplomatic embassies and thus receive full diplomatic 
recognition of East Germany by West Germany; third, the SED
wanted the German border to be along the middle and not the
western bank of the Elbe River; and finally, the SED wanted 
the West German information center in Salzgitter, which 
collected human rights abuses against the SED regime, 
closed. The Gera demands were aimed at increasing the GDR's
sovereignty while detaching it from the West.
112Hanhardt, 388.
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Honecker*s actions threatened to weaken Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe. As political analyst Eric Frey concludes: 
"Moscow intervened against the inter-German thaw because it 
feared to lose control over its European empire."113
Yet although the USSR officially reprimanded the SED 
leaders for their conduct, this action did not indicate that 
the Soviets rejected inner-German dialogue. As German 
affairs analyst Ronald Asmus reveals: "Moscow has thus far
tolerated a certain 'decoupling' in inter-German relations 
from both the INF issues and broader east-west trends."114 
The Soviet Union did not want the GDR to refrain from its 
inner-German relationship but only from making policy 
decisions independent of the USSR.
No doubt the Soviets believed that East German 
stability would help to ensure Soviet domination in the 
communist bloc. As instability in Poland grew because of 
actions of the independent trade union, Solidarity, the 
Soviets realized that it was crucial to maintain the SED 
regime's stability. One way for the SED government to 
remain stable was to keep the East Germans acquiescent. The 
Soviets knew this and realized that inner-German relations 
should continue but on Soviet and not just East German 
terms. East European expert Edwina Moreton explains:
113Frey, 135.
114Asmus, 145.
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Even the row between East Germany and the Soviet Union 
. . . still appear[ed] to be largely about tactics for 
getting the best deal for a separate East Germany out 
of neighboring West Germany, rather than any more 
fundamental clash over long-term aims with respect to 
West Germany."115
So, by refusing to allow Honecker's visit to the Federal
Republic, the USSR confirmed that the SED was limited in its
ability to deviate from Soviet policy.
Just as the Soviet Union was concerned with East
Germany's role in the inter-German detente, so too was the
United States concerned with West Germany's position. Even
with West Germany's Bundestag voting to accept US missiles,
many conservative American politicians remained upset with
West Germany's leaders for continuing economic transactions
and political negotiations with Honecker's communist regime.
The Reagan Administration perceived the FRG to be taking a
separate route as West Germany's relationship with the
United States "was no longer one of submission, but one of
strong and sometimes highly competitive partners who clashed
repeatedly over military and economic issues."116 American
politicians raised questions regarding the Federal
Republic's loyalty to NATO and West European security.
Conservatives dreaded the possible consequences of the
inter-German relationship, in the form of the rebirth of a
single German nation whose past revealed it to be an
115Moreton, 440.
116Frey, 68.
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aggressive and expansionist power.117 Also, the rise in 
popularity of the FRG's anti-nuclear Green Party in West 
Germany, increased the US government’s concerns about West 
European security. However, because the FRG had more 
autonomy in foreign policy than the GDR did, the United 
States had fewer methods of controlling the West German 
leaders than the Soviet Union had of influencing the East 
German regime.
Despite the worsening of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the West-East German 
relationship continued. Although the USSR sought to get the 
SED government to reduce its autonomy in inter-German 
relations, the East German regime was reluctant to do so.
Too much would be lost by minimizing relations with West 
Germany, economically as well as politically. So, a 
confident Honecker saw it beneficial for his state and 
regime to continue relations with the West. However as the 
next chapter reveals, not only did he underestimate the 
affects of West German penetration in East German society, 
but his attempts to form foreign policy autonomous from the 
Soviet Union and its new leader would undermine the 
stability of his regime.
117Hanhardt, 380.
CHAPTER VI
GORBACHEV AND THE EAST GERMAN REVOLUTION: 1985-90
On 11 March 1985, the young, dynamic Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU). In less than five years this man 
would alter the balance of power dramatically in Europe by 
renouncing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's 
approach to reforming the Soviet economic, political and 
social systems led the East German population to demand 
similar reforms by the SED government. The East German 
regime, whose stability was guaranteed by Soviet force 
alone, failed to listen to its citizens' demands and faced 
mounting discontent. The turning point came when Gorbachev 
refrained from using Soviet force to prop up the SED regime 
in the face of mass protests in October 1989, an external 
political decision which catalyzed the unexpected East 
German revolution and allowed for the reunification of 
Germany. Once again, the international environment affected 
the internal politics of the GDR in a fashion that no one 
predicted— the loss of even the facade of SED legitimation; 
the demise of communist hegemony; and the resolution of the 
postwar German reunification question.
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Before analyzing the events preceding the East German
revolution, it is first necessary to define the term
•revolution'. Revolutions are complex events and a variety
of definitions exist. One element found in most revolution
theories is the use of violence.118 However, the
revolution which occurred in East Germany did not entail
violence. Despite the lack of violence, one can argue that
a revolution did take place. According to theorist Ekkart
Zimmermann, although the use of violence is not the
characteristic of revolutions, violence is often an
unavoidable component in bringing about a revolution.119
The most important aspect of a revolution is that
transformations occur in the prevailing social and political
structures. Samuel Huntington's definition expands on this
idea. Huntington states:
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental . . . change in 
the dominant values [concepts of legitimacy] and myths 
of a society, in its political institutions, social 
structure [economic relationships], leadership, and 
government activity and policies [in short, the 
demolition of the existing social, economic, and 
political order and the effort to substitute an 
entirely new one].120
118See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 264?
Mark Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: 
Dodd, Mead and Co., 1974), 1; Nicholas Timasheff, War and 
Revolution (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 12.
119Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence. Crises, and 
Revolutions: Theories and Research (Boston: G. K. Hall &
Co., 1983), 296.
120Huntington, 264.
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Using hindsight, there can be no disagreement that the 
events of 1989-1990 in East Germany brought transformations 
in the country’s social, economic and political structures. 
Therefore, despite the lack of violence, it seems clear that 
a revolution did take place in East Germany.
Many existing theories seek to explain the causes of 
revolution through social or psychological observations or 
by focusing on the structure of state institutions and their 
economies.121 Still, these interpretations do not provide 
a complete account of the causes of revolution in East 
Germany.
One major flaw found in many revolution theories is 
that they tend to minimize or overlook the importance of 
external factors contributing to revolution. This is not to 
say that internal factors are not important for 
understanding revolution, only that in the particular case 
of East Germany— a state dominated by the Soviet Union and 
strongly influenced by the FRG— external forces contributed 
profoundly to the GDR's revolution. Because the economic 
and political links which connected the GDR to the Soviet
121See Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions:
Theoretical. Comparative, and Historical Studies (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1986), 1-2; James Davies, 
"Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological 
Review 27 (February 1962), 6; Theda Skocpol, States and 
Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France.
Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), 4, 33.
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Union were so strong, the USSR possessed the means to affect 
domestic developments in East Germany. At the same time, 
the FRG contributed to East German revolution by providing 
the East Germans with alternatives to their restricted 
lifestyles.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the GDR1s economy faltered. 
Nevertheless, according to American foreign policy expert 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, the internal economic situation should 
not be seen as the reason for the GDR revolt; rather, it was 
the Soviet Union's own appalling economic situation that 
eventually triggered revolution in East Germany.122
In the Soviet Union, the new leader, Gorbachev, faced 
pressing economic problems. Due to a multitude of factors, 
the USSR's economy was in shambles.123 First, the inherent 
distortions and inefficiencies of the Soviet centrally 
planned system (the same one it forced onto the GDR) failed 
and gradually caused the deterioration of the economy. 
Second, the economic concessions the USSR granted to its 
satellite states (including East Germany) also hurt the 
Soviet economy: "Moscow used what has amounted to Soviet
subsidies in order to achieve and maintain East European
122Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Enough to Break an Old 
Bolshevik's Heart," Washington Post. 8 November 1989, 23(A).
123To analyze the Soviet economic failures would be 
another paper in itself, and therefore the author will 
provide only a summary.
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economic structures."124 Third, the role the USSR played 
as the military leader of the Warsaw Pact added to the 
Soviet Union's financial burdens, as well as its role in the 
Afghanistan War and other costly Third World conflicts. 
Finally, the intensification of the military rivalry with 
the United States under President Reagan contributed to the 
Soviet Union's economic crisis. Reagan challenged the 
Soviets to an all-out arms race through the deployment of 
the INF missiles and the introduction of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). The USSR had to divert resources 
towards its defense industry to meet the US challenge; the 
Soviet Union spent money it needed to invest in modernizing 
the civilian sector on defense instead to maintain its 
superpower status. In essence, a combination of internal 
and external economic conditions forced the Soviet 
leadership to consider a new path for the USSR— one that 
would place Soviet national interests first, above the 
interests of international communism. This new path 
ultimately led Gorbachev to abandon the communist leaders in 
the Soviet Union's satellite bloc.
Gorbachev tried to transform the Soviet Union, 
economically, socially and politically, via his reform 
policies of qlasnost and perestroika. These reforms 
conflicted with the communist ideology of the past.
Glasnost called for more openness and democratization in the
124Dawisha, 90.
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tightly centralized and controlled political system.
Economic reforms of perestroika included decentralization of 
industry, decreasing price subsidies, and improving the 
quality of goods produced in the Soviet Union. These 
reforms were intended to introduce aspects of a market 
economy into the centrally planned economic system.
Gorbachev called for reforms to prevent the collapse of the 
Soviet economy through the introduction of some elements 
found in free-market economic systems.
At the onset, Gorbachev's reforms appeared to be 
intended solely for the USSR and not Eastern Europe, as he 
promised not to force Soviet reform onto the communist bloc 
nations; however, even if Gorbachev intended for qlasnost 
and perestroika to apply only to the Soviet Union, the East 
Germans were deeply influenced by the reforms. They 
understood that Gorbachev's proclamations for fundamental 
reform in the Soviet Union had enormous implications for 
their future development too. As political scientist Karen 
Dawisha contends, "by opening the debate in the Soviet Union 
about radical reform, the Soviets were implicitly giving, 
whether they wished or not, the green light for similar 
debates and experiments throughout Eastern Europe [including 
the GDR]."125 The East Germans, as other communist 
satellite populations, began to believe that things could
125Ibid., 163.
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change. Admired by the East German people for reforming, 
Gorbachev soon became their inspiration and role model.
Gradually, by the late 1980s, Gorbachev began to 
encourage Eastern European states to follow the reforms of 
the Soviet Union by stating: "Moscow will tolerate almost
any political or economic system among its allies, as long 
as they remain in the Warsaw Pact and do nothing detrimental 
to Soviet security interests.1,126 According to political 
analyst Elizabeth Pound, the Soviet leader hoped that top- 
down reforms would prevent bottom-up revolution.127 
Reforms flowing downwards, from the communist leaders rather 
than upwards from the masses, could act as a pressure valve. 
The leaders would decide on the type of reform and then 
would control the amount of change.
Honecker!s fear of change caused him to cool relations 
with the USSR as the radical Gorbachev suggested strongly 
that the GDR consider economic, political and social 
reforms. The SED leader clung to his orthodox views, 
believing that Gorbachev's radical reforms would fail. In 
addition, Honecker and other aging SED leaders perceived 
East Germany as a superior socialist state compared to the 
Soviet Union, claiming: "We can say with complete
justification that we have built a society .that can stand
126George Church, "Freedom," Time, 20 November 1989, 29.
127Elizabeth Pound, "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of
German Unification in the GDR, International Security 15 
(Fall 1990), 35.
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any comparison.1,128 When speaking at the SED Congress in 
April 1986, Honecker*s tone was described as "self- 
satisfaction that approaches eulogy" and even with Gorbachev 
present, he failed to follow the usual routine of 
acknowledging the Soviet Union as the vanguard leader.129
Honecker appeared confident in refusing to accept 
Gorbachev's reform policies. In November 1987, Chief 
ideologist Kurt Hager officially rejected qlasnost as a 
model for the GDR.130 The SED government even tried to 
censor West German and Soviet telecommunications and printed 
material which alluded to perestroika or qlasnost. The East 
German regime remained skeptical of any revisions towards a 
democratic political or a free-market economic system 
because it saw them as being extremely dangerous to its 
stability. Honecker realized the threat of these reforms. 
They would remove East Germany's whole defense for needing a 
separate, socialist identity and would certainly lead to the 
GDR's assimilation into the more appealing West German 
state.131 As East European analyst Otto Ulc notes: 
"Gorbachev's reforms mean destabilizing, politically risky
1280tto Ulc, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Will
the Reforms in the USSR Make a Difference?" In The 
Uncertain Future: Gorbachev's Eastern Bloc, eds. Nicholas
N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes (New York: Paragon House,
1988), 130.
129Ibid.
130Pound, 39.
131Ibid., 41.
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cures— cures that are even more risky for governments with a 
precarious legitimacy.”132
Gorbachev's renunciation of the use of force applied 
not only to his decision not to coerce Eastern European 
regimes to reform, but also to his decision not to intervene 
in the anti-regime uprisings which swept Eastern Europe in 
the fall of 1989. Gorbachev opted not to use coercion 
because he had renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and the use 
of force in the Soviet's satellite states. As Soviet 
foreign ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov stated: "The
time is past when the Soviet Union would intervene 
militarily in Eastern Europe in the name of socialism."133 
The Soviet Union did not want to reduce its chances of 
improving relations with the West which any act of coercion 
might do:
Clearly the Soviets want nothing to happen in Eastern 
Europe that would jeopardize the arms reductions with 
the West or interfere with their attempt to cut through 
the isolation from Western economies. That means no 
Soviet tanks in the streets to repress Eastern European 
demonstrations and insurrections.134
The USSR's decision not to use force to prop up its 
client states in Eastern Europe had momentous consequences
132Ulc, 125.
133Bennett Korvig, "To End an Empire: Western Dilemmas
in Eastern Europe," In the Uncertain Future: Gorbachev's
Eastern Bloc, eds. Nicholas N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes (New 
York: Paragon House, 1988), 216.
1340pinion Editorial, "East Germany's Fall and Rise," 
Washington Post. 19 November 1989, 6(D).
for the fate of the East German regime. Jeane Kirkpatrick 
and other foreign policy experts agree that in the past the 
SED survived only by absolute force.135 After the Soviet 
troops squashed the 1953 rebellion, the Soviets remained 
with an estimated 3 50,000 troops. Western analysts, 
politicians and foreign policy makers held the conventional 
wisdom that the East Germans felt passive acceptance towards 
their communist government; however, the truth was that in 
the past, the East Germans' fear of Soviet intervention had 
overpowered their desire for change. In effect, as Dawisha 
states: "The military . . . has thus proved to be the most
reliable instrument of ultimate Soviet control."136 By 
ignoring Gorbachev and his calls to reform, Honecker's 
regime risked losing its only base of authority. Without 
Soviet military support, the SED government would be left 
without any other foundation of power.
When Gorbachev reversed the Brezhnev Doctrine and 
condemned the use of force, elites in the conservative, 
anti-reform GDR now were vulnerable to a populace desperate 
for change. Without the Soviet troops, the SED leaders 
"were left to confront their own countrymen without certain 
support from the Soviet troops they had welcomed."137
135Kirkpatrick.
136Dawisha, 84.
137Kirkpatr ick.
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On 7 October 1989, during a speech in East Germany 
celebrating the 40th anniversary of the GDR, comments made 
by Gorbachev indicated that he wanted the SED regime to 
follow his reform policy, warning: "The decisions [for
reform] lay with the East German leaders . . . but 'life 
punishes him who comes too late.1"138 At the same time, he 
stated that East Germany must decide its own future. This 
declaration signalled to many East German observers that 
Soviet troops would not be used to maintain a communist
139regime.,:>y
By tolerating revolutionary events in other Eastern 
bloc nations, such as Poland electing a non-communist 
government, Hungary destroying its barbed wire border with 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia releasing East German exiles to 
the FRG, the USSR impressed on the East Germans that it 
would not use force against those who tried to reform. 
Because of his declaration that the use of force would not 
be tolerated and his record of toleration, East Germans 
assumed Gorbachev would restrain his troops. (The Soviet 
chief of staff in Moscow commanded the Warsaw Pact troops 
stationed in the GDR.) Without worries of Soviet 
intervention, East Germans were relatively free to revolt.
138Pound, 42.
139Gorbachev had previously shown his tolerance and 
acceptance for non-socialist reforms in other Eastern bloc 
states, such as Poland and Hungary, by not using force to 
overturn them.
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And just as the East Germans expected, when the uprisings 
began, the troops did not act with repressive measures.140
Without the Soviet troops, Honecker was left without 
any source of authority, and the essential illegitimacy of 
his regime was exposed.. It became clear that the SED regime 
had failed to build legitimacy. The illegitimacy of the 
regime had several sources.
First, Honecker and other members of the Politburo 
remained isolated from, rather than responsive to, the 
citizens in whose name they supposedly ruled. Few ties 
between the elite and the populace existed. Elections in 
the GDR were meaningless because they offered no substantial 
political alternatives to the SED. The function of 
elections was to provide a propaganda campaign for the 
policies of the SED and state. There also was a lack of 
ruler accountability. The East German leaders were not 
accountable to the 'voters'; citizens' demands went, for the 
most part, unnoticed. So, the leaders of the GDR were not 
representatives of the people, as communist ideology 
espoused.
Second, communist ideology failed to bring about any 
legitimacy to the SED government. One important goal of
140Although the Soviet troops did not overcome the 
protestors, Honecker did call the East German police 
(Stasis) to quiet the rioters during the October 7 protest. 
Afterwards, when the crowds had grown too large for the 
police forces to suppress, he told the troops to prepare for 
attack? however, his orders went ignored.
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communist ideology, the creation of a classless society, 
failed to be accomplished in the GDR. In East Germany class 
did exist, and the elite remained far better off than the 
rest of society. In the GDR, the communist leaders drove 
flashy Western cars, shopped in specialty stores and 
maintained vacation homes, while most East German citizens 
had few choices and inferior products. Milovan Djilas 
introduced the argument of the "new class," in which 
communism instead of destroying the class system, merely 
substituted a new elite for the old bourgeoisie.141 This 
theory proved to be true regarding the GDR.
Also, the democratic centralist principle used for 
decision making and administration within the East German 
communist party remained a second failure of communist 
ideology. It was only a facade in which centralism took 
pure precedence over democratic principles. A small elite 
group made decisions which the rest of the party had to 
approve without any dissent. Therefore, decisions made by 
the elite lacked any real popular support.
Finally, the failure of the SED regime to meet its 
economic goals and achievements prevented the government 
from gaining legitimacy. Although the SED leaders continued 
to proclaim the GDR to be an economic miracle, contacts with 
West Germany, as well as cutbacks in Soviet subsidies and
141See Milovan Djilas, The New Class; An Analysis of 
the Communist System (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1957).
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aid, proved the SED regime's claim of its state's superior 
status false.
Honecker's desire to continue relations with the FRG 
forced him to deal with the delicate and difficult task of 
balancing capitalism and socialism. This task proved beyond 
his control. The infiltration of West German technology and 
ideas showed the East Germans that their regime had deceived 
them about the GDR being a superior economic state. East 
Germans wanted the Western alternative. Also, the East 
Germans learned that not only was the USSR, or the "vanguard 
leader" of socialism, attempting reforms but that reforms 
were taking place in other East European countries, 
particularly Hungary and Poland. Despite the demands by the 
East Germans and requests from Mikhail Gorbachev for the GDR 
leadership to initiate reforms, Honecker refused. Thus, the 
Soviet Union withdrew its support from the Honecker regime.
Because the SED regime failed to follow Gorbachev's 
popular reform model and lost the backing of the Soviet 
Union and its troops, it no longer retained any form of 
legitimacy. Without any popular or Soviet troop support, 
the SED had no prospects for survival. The GDR held 
elections in March of 1990 similar to those found in 
democratic nations; the SED did not win. As fears over 
economic conditions rose, so too did aspirations for a 
unified Germany. Although Great Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union had several reservations about German
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reunification, the United States supported it. In reality, 
these states, including the Soviet Union, possessed little 
if any real power to prevent reunification from occurring 
(although East and West Germany did include them in their 
talks concerning reunification). Throughout the decades, 
the world heard reunification rhetoric. When the time for 
it finally came, nearly everyone seems to have been taken by 
surprise, with respect to the speed of events, at the least. 
On 3 October 1990, East and West Germany merged and finally 
ended the forty year old German question.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Until the fall of 1989, most western states did not 
anticipate the decline of the Soviet Union's hegemony over 
East Germany. The leaders of these western states also 
failed to foresee the possibility of the East German 
communists relinquishing control of East Germany. No one 
single factor is responsible for ending the SED's domination 
in East Germany. However, as Peter Gourevitch's hypothesis 
suggests, by analyzing domestic and international events 
together as a whole and not separately, one can understand 
the reasons behind the overthrow of the SED regime. In 
fact, analyzing the downfall of the SED by another method 
would only provide an incomplete evaluation of the event.
This thesis concludes that three main factors, one 
internal and two external, contributed to the East German 
revolution. The internal factor consisted of the SED 
regime's inability to fulfill the promises that it made to 
the East German population. When comparing East and West 
Germany, the SED proclaimed West Germany to be a socially 
and economically inferior state. However, after several 
decades in power, the SED regime failed to make East Germany 
an economically superior state. Additionally, the regime 
failed ideologically to convince the East Germans of their
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state's superiority. This fact was emphasized by a second 
factor leading to the regime's overthrow.
The impact of West German financial, cultural and 
technical penetration into East German society continued to 
prove to the East Germans that West Germany was indeed 
beyond their state's comparison. This fact was made more 
apparent as the number of people with access to television 
increased. Television brought news and information from the 
uncensored West German state into the homes of most East 
Germans. Now the East Germans had real proof that their 
leaders' claims were just propaganda, and life in West 
Germany continued to be more appealing to those individuals 
in the GDR.
Finally, the rapidly deteriorating economic situation 
in the Soviet Union led to the SED regime's downfall. 
Gorbachev introduced reforms in the Soviet Union and 
gradually began pressuring the SED leadership to introduce 
similar reforms. By doing so, Gorbachev openly challenged 
the authority of the anti-reformist East German leaders.
The East German communists, however, ignored Gorbachev and 
his demands for change. Gorbachev decided that Soviet 
hegemony over East Germany, as well as other East European 
states, was no longer in the USSR's best interest. With 
this thought in mind, he guaranteed that Soviet troops would 
no longer be used to maintain the East German regime. When 
it became apparent to the East German population that the
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Soviet Union would no longer use force to back the SED 
government, the people revolted. Without force, the SED 
regime had no economic, ideologic or popular basis of 
legitimacy and no basis for governing. With no indigenous 
support, no Soviet military support and a population eager 
for change, the Government of the GDR fell, as the East 
Germans revolted against their SED regime and laid the 
foundation for a reunified German state.
This combination of international and domestic factors 
led to the revolution which ended over forty years of SED 
domination. To examine only one factor would provide an 
incomplete analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the 
SED regime. This thesis shows how three important factors 
contributed to the radical transformations which occurred in 
what was once a state known as East Germany.
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